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Management responsibility for the Navy's administrative
telephones is in transition from the Commander, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command to the Commander, Naval
Telecommunications Command. This shift of responsibility
was precipitated by fundamental structural changes within
the telecommunications industry, changes which produced a
volatile market structure rife with competition. A new
management strategy is required to deal with these changes.
The development of alternative strategies for administrative
telephones is prerequisite to any cost-benefit analysis
which may be necessary to choose the most cost-effective
strategic option for overall system planning and management.
This thesis exa nines the various system and environ-
mental factors which impact upon a selection of a management
strategy, and within the constraints imposed by these
factors, develops a hybrid management strategy alternative
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I- INTRO DDCTION
A. A PEEIOD OF TRANSITION
The transfer of management responsibility for adminis-
trative telephones within the Department of the Navy (DON)
commenced on October 1, 1984. At that time, the Commander,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (CGMNAVFACENGCCH)
passed policy formulation and control functions to the
Commander, Naval Telecommunications Command (COMNAVTELCOM)
.
In order to assure continuity of authority, total responsi-
bility for Navy administrative telephones will transition
gradually. This transition period is scheduled to be
completed by July 1, 1985, at which time COMA VTELCOM will
assume full management responsibility. Naval administrative
telephone facilities and services, as currently defined,
include [Bef. 1: end (1), pp. 1-2]:
a) Automatic or manual systems providing a Shore (Field)
Activity with common user, on-base telephone service
connected to a commercial telephone system through
trunk lines. The telephone facilities and services
may be Government-owned and/or leased, including such
items as instruments and associated apparatus, and
outside cable plant.
b) Other local, cn-base communications systems that may
use portions of the local telephone system, such as
public address systems, administrative intercom
systems, fire reporting systems, and alarm systems.
c) local, on-base telephone facilities that interconnect
with AUTOVON (e.g., digit 8 level dialing).
d) Foreign exchange lines
e) Off-premise extensions
f) Wide Area Telecommunications Service (WATS)
g) Teletypewriter Exchange Service (TWX) and
International and Domestic Teleprinter Exchange
Service (TELEX) - Commercial services permitting tele-
typewriter communications on the same basis as tele-
phone service, operating through central switchboards
to stations within the same city or in other cities.
This realignment of responsibility can be viewed as an
effort by the Department of the Navy to react to the funda-
mental structural change within the telecommunications
industry resulting frcm its evolution into a fully competi-
tive market structure. * The proliferation of hardware and
services in a competitive industry coupled with techno-
logical advances resulting from increased private-sector
research and development (RSD) efforts further compound
management problems.
The choice of COMNAVTELCOM to spearhead this new manage-
ment thrust for administrative telephones was a natural one,
since included in the COMNAVTELCOM mission is "the satisfac-
tion of all tactical, administrative and logistics informa-
tion transfer requirements of the Navy" [Bef. 2z p. 1**]-
Born from its predecessor, the Naval Communications Command,
in 1972 as a result of a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
advisory committee report, COMNAVTELCOH quickly adopted a
systems approach to managing the Naval Telecommunications
System (NTS). 2 Historically, the NTS had grown in a piece-
meal fashion, as autonomous units outlined their specifica-
tions and requirements and submitted them for funding and
implementation. This had resulted in a fragmented system
plagued by slow and unreliable information handling systems.
l The circumstances surrounding this competitive lovement
are detailed in Chapter IV.
2 Specific management duties are detailed in References 1
and 3
.
Additionally, it had produced a piecemeal approach to
planning and an underutilization of system resources. The
adoption of a systems approach by COHNAVTELCOM produced a
more coherent, interoperable, state-of-the-art NTS.
£Ref. 2: p. 164]
A similar challenge exists in the arena of administra-
tive telephones- COMNAVTELCOM is assuming management
responsibility for a varietal collection of terminal equip-
ment, wiring, switchboards, private branch exchanges (P3Xs)
and private automatic branch exchanges (PABXs) (both owned
and leased) , and a multitude of contracts for service in
support of Naval installations throughout the world. Just
as with the NTS, a systems approach to management is
required if a more coherent, state-of-the-art administrative
telephone system is to be achieved. It is with this systems
approach in mind that the term Naval Administrative
Telephone System (NATS) will be used throughout this thesis
to refer to the collection of hardware and services for
which COMNAVTELCOM must formulate a management strategy.
B. THEOBETICAL FRAMEHOBK
Traditionally, when faced with complex problems such as
this, organizations have resorted to a problem resolution
technique embodied in the age-old adage "divide and
conquer." The key premise of this technique is that if a
complex (macro-) problem is divided into a set of smaller
(micro-) problems, then the solution set of these micro-
problems, when merged, will yield a solution to the macro-
problem. This chunking technique, as Peters and Waterman
termed it [Ref. 4: p. 126], was a key factor in the develop-
ment of organizational design and management theory during
this century. This body of theory can be grouped into two
separate sets with the primary differences being the
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methodology used to accomplish the chunking and the coordi-
nating mechanisms employed to merge the micro-solutions into
an answer to the macro-problem. 3
1 • The Closed System Ap pr oach
The early thrust of organizational development and
management theory was based upon the concept of elementarism
(i.e., viewing the total as a sum of its individual parts)
[Ref- 5: pp. 376-377]. This view has been termed the closed
system approach, since it treats an organization as indepen-
dent of its external environment. This view was embodied in
the classical approach to organizational theory espoused by
theorists such as Max Weber, Henri Fayol and Frederick
Taylor. The classical approach held that the most efficient
and effective organizations had a hierarchical structure
based upon legalized, formal authority [Ref. 6: pp.
353-355]. It was Weber who called such a formalized organi-
zational structure a "bureaucracy".
The neoclassical approach was the next stage of the
closed system theory evolution. The advocates of the
neoclassical approach were Douglas McGregor (with his Theory
X and Theory Y) , Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, et. al.
[Ref. 6: pp. 355-359]. The neoclassicists held that the
bureaucratic model of the classicists relied too heavily
upon formal authority and thus stifled individuals. The
neoclassicists advocated that a less formal structure which
would incorporate basic human needs such as self-reliance,
self-expression and accomplishment would be more efficient
and effective than the bureaucratic model.
The classical and neoclassical approaches dominated
management theory and practice until the 1960s.
Organizations were structured along hierarchical lines, as
3 See Reference 4, chapter 4 for a synopsis of the evolu-
tion of this management theory.
1 1
is the Department of the Navy, and the chunking of macro-
problems was accomplished through the structural overlay of
the hierarchy. The coordinating mechanism used in this
approach is the hierarchical structure itself and the formal
authority upon which it operates. Micro-solutions are
generated at the lower levels of the hierarchy and forwarded
up the chain-of-command. At each higher level of the struc-
ture, micro-solutions from lower levels are fused and
forwarded to the next echelon. This process then, theoreti-
cally, yields a macro-solution at the top level of the
structure. This hierarchical structure for Navy telecommu-
nications is shown in Figure 1.1.
2- Th e Op_en System A pproa ch
In the 1960s the body of theory was enriched with
the popularization of the open system approach, 4 an approach
based upon a more synergistic view (i.e., that the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts) [Eef. 5: p. 376]. The
open system approach asserts that the organization is not
independent of its environment but, in fact, the external
environment is a major variable affecting both organiza-
tional structure and processes.
The open system view has been embodied in the
contingency approaches to organizational design and manage-
ment theory. These theories do not presuppose a single,
most efficient or most effective view of structuring, as did
the closed system theories, but rather the contingency
approaches hold that the appropriate structure must form a
fit with the organization's strategy, technology, environ-
ment, and people.
^Although popularized in the 1960s, this approach
stemmed from General Systems Theory which was developed in
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The open systems view has given rise to scores of operations
researchers, systems analysts, management scientists, et.
al., who labor to model the complex interactions between
strategy, environment, technology, and people. These
complex interactions involve interdependency and change and
as Cleland and King put it, "... the solutions to these
challenges will themselves involve a significant degree of
interdependence, complexity, and need to adapt to change"
[Ref. 8; p. 4].
The contingency approaches have been embodied in a
number of organizational efforts since their popularization
in the 1960s. Most notable of these efforts have been the
matrix and project or program structures. The program (or
project) structure has been used extensively in the Navy,
most notably in the Systems Commands. The chunking of
macro-problems in the contingency approaches is accomplished
along functional or task lines. The coordinating mechanism
is inherent in the functional or task sub-structure itself,
i.e., the program management team's authority and expertise
span traditional hierarchical boundaries and therefore can
accomplish coordination within the sub-structure.
It is within this theoretical framework of the
closed and open systems approaches that this thesis will
focus. In Chapter II, the strategic options available to
C0MNAVTE1C0K for managing the Navy's administrative tele-
phones are presented from a closed system viewpoint. The
internal variables associated with the closed system
approach are presented in Chapter III. This nucleus of
internal variables is augmented in Chapter IV with the addi-
tion of the external or environmental variables which are
pertinent to the open system approach. The formulation of a
closed system strategy based upon the identified internal
variables is presented in Chapter V. The complexities asso-
ciated with the development of an open system strategy are
14
discussed in Chapter VI. This discussion is based upon both
the internal and external variables presented in Chapters
III and IV. Chapter VII summarizes the analysis of the NATS
management challenge and specific recommendations are
included in order to focus efforts to meet the complexity of
this challenge.
15
II. CLOSED SYSTEM STRATEGIC OPTIONS
From a closed system approach, several options are
available to COMNA vTELCOM for NATS management. These
options range from what is referred to as a totally in- house
strategy {all management functions being performed by Naval
personnel and/or DON civilian employees and ail equipment
and services being provided by Navy assets) to the ether
extreme, an all contract strategy (all management, equipment
and services provided under contract by the private sector)
.
The third alternative, a hybrid approach, is a combination
of these two extremes; a strategy calling for a mix of both
in-house and contract approaches.
These options are similar to those presented in the Navy
Commercial Activities Program. 5 This program is based upon
Office of Management and 3udget (OMB) Circular A-76 and is
implemented within the Navy by References 10, 11, and 12.
Commercial activities are defined as those activities
performed by Government or Defense Department personnel
which provide a product or service that could be obtained
from the private sector.
A. CCHHEBCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM
The Commercial Activities Program embodies the general
policy of relying on the private sector for goods and
services while, at the same time, recognizing that certain
functions may be intrinsically governmental or defense-
related and therefore, must be performed in-house. The
underlying principle is that when private sector performance
5 Although the sources cited are out of date, Reference 9
provides a good overview of the Navy's Commercial Activities
Program.
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is feasible, the ultimate decision will be based upon the
most cost-effective method, whether private sector or
in-house. In order to make the decision regarding cost-
effectiveness, a cost comparison study is performed for
those functions determined to be non-exempt due to govern-
mental or defense-related reasons- [Eef. 13: pp. 41-46]
The Navy's Commercial Activities Program consists of
three phases: inventory, review and cost comparison
[Ref. 14: p. D-73]. During the inventory phase all shore
activities identify and inventory their commercial activi-
ties. These activities are then reviewed and if defense-
related or other exemption reasons cannot be identified and
if the product or service is available from the private
sector, then a cost comparison is initiated.
The cost comparison phase is comprised of the management
study, the Performance Work Statement (PWS) and the cost
analysis. The management study "is conducted to ensure that
the in-house approach is organized and staffed as effi-
ciently and effectively as possible and that procedures are
conducive to proper performance of services. The in-house
cost estimate will be based upon the results of the manage-
ment study and thus, this process serves a fundamental
purpose in forcing managers to address management procedures
from an efficiency and effectiveness standpoint.
The Performance Work Statement is prepared in conjunc-
tion with the management analysis in accordance with
guidance contained in Federal Procurement Policy Pamphlet
No. 4. The PWS is a performance oriented, concise statement
of the current or anticipated governmental requirements and
details the procedures to be used to determine if those
requirements have been met.
The cost analysis phase consists of computing the
in-house cost estimate (based upon the results of the
management study and the PWS) and obtaining cost estimates
17
for the private sector from contractor bids received in
response to solicitations (which are also based upon the
PWS) . These two costs are then compared and a decision made
as to which alternative, the in-house or contract, is more
cost effective.
One issue worthy of note with respect to this process is
the predisposition fcr cost overruns in those cases where
the private sector or contract approach has been selected.
2s Bob Edgeil, a contracting specialist with the American
Federation of Government Employees, pointed out in a recent
interview, of the 235 service contracts awarded by the
defense Department during 1981 and 1982, the actual price
tag for the contracts ran an average 11.4 percent over the
initial cost estimates. The Navy showed the largest cost
overrun (16 percent) , even though Navy contracts represented
only a small percentage of the total for these two years.
r*r. Edgeil further contended that these cost overruns were
"wiping out any purported savings" from converting govern-
ment jobs to the private sector. [Ref. 15]
The final and, perhaps, most significant issue to be
examined is the Commercial Activities Program's reinforce-
ment of a closed system approach to management. The program
is focused at the field activity level. Although the field
activities' commanding officers may consider "... results of
manpower surveys, management studies, audit reports, work
force/union involvement, etc. , in arriving at the optimum
organization" [Bef. 11: p. IV-20], they are constrained by
policy and guidance from the chain-of-command, in that func-
tional tasks, procedural specifications and reporting
requirements (and report formats), etc., are established by
higher authority- Since the local management effort is
focused toward implementation of guidance from higher
authority, the most cost-effective in-house organization and
the EWS as well, will be similarly focused toward
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implementation. This method is subject to the same argument
as other classical or neoclassical approaches, i.e., that it
will not yield an effective organization because "It does
not take into account rapidly changing and uncertain envi-
ronments" [fief. 6: pp. 354-355]. It is with this issue in
mind that a more global approach is adopted for developing a
management strategy for the Navy administrative telephone
system.
B. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES
1 . The In-House Strategy
The Navy, unlike the Army and Air Force, maintains
no resident corps of uniformed communications personnel who
would reap training benefits from maintaining and operating
the NATS. The lack of such a nucleus of Naval personnel
precludes maintaining the NATS for any skill-sustaining
reasons. This lack of trained personnel diminishes the
appeal of the in-house strategy since the costs associated
with organizing, training and administering such a corps to
meet certain NATS requirements, such as installation and
maintenance duties, would be prohibitive. Similarly, the
costs of building such a corps of DON civilian employees
would be such that a total in-house strategy for NATS
management is not considered a viable option.
2. The Contract Strategy
This strategy is exemplified by the General Services
Administration (GSA) issuance 6 of a Request for Proposal
(EFP) on February 13, 1985 for private sector bids on a
ten-year, $4.2 billion contract for replacing the
6 The standard method employed for soliciting proposals
or bids from the private sector is through publication of a
notice in the Commerce Business Daily.
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22-year-old Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) . GSA,
the Federal government's contracting agent, requested propo-
sals to establish "an all-digital network capable of trans-
mitting voice, video and data among government offices
around the country" [fief. 16]- GSA also wants the contract
to include the management of all billing and maintenance for
the system. As a GSA spokesman, Bob Bushelle, was quoted as
saying in an Associated Press story [Ref. 17]:
"What the government wants is a one-stop telecommunica-
tions company « operated by a single prime contractor,
that can provide and manage a total system service for
1-3 million government workers for 10 years starting in
1989."
In the same story, Frank J. Carr, Assistant GSA
Administrator of Information Resources Management, was
quoted, "We are not interested in setting up a government
system".
This GSA action must be examined in a broader
context in order to understand the strategic option it
implies. In addition to performing as the Federal govern-
ment's contracting agent/ GSA is one of the twenty-two
Federal entities which comprise the National Communications
System (NCS) . The NCS was created under a memorandum issued
by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 as a result of communi-
cations difficulties experienced by the Executive branch
during the Cuban missile crisis. [Ref- 18]
As a member of the NCS, GSA must comply with the
policy principles which govern the NCS; principles promul-
gated in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) number
97, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1983. The key
policy principle of NSDD-97 applicable in this instance is:
"continue to place reliance on commercial or private tele-
communications resources for critical government-wide tele-
communications" [Ref- 19: p. 15]- Thus, in its issuance of
20
the EFP, GSA is choosing the contract strategy which aligns
with the policy principles of NSDD-97 in addition to the
general policy of reliance on the private sector promulgated
in OMB Circular A-76. The implicit assumption in GSA's
action is that the most cost-effective strategic option for
the FTS is to contract for a 'one-stop telecommunications
company'
.
3- The Hybrid Strategy
In formulating a management strategy for NATS,
C0HNAVTZLC0K does not face the policy constraints of
NSDD-97, since NATS assets are not constituents of the NCS.
Although the Navy Ccmmercial Activities Program is focused
upon individual field activities, the same general philos-
ophy must apply to NATS management. Thus, C0I1N AVTELCOM may
have greater latitude in choosing a management strategy tut
the choices are still constrained by the implicit mandate to
perform the mission in the most cost-effective manner.
Therefore, the choice of a management strategy is one of
cost-benefit analysis among the various options.
In order to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the
options, detailed cost data must be developed. In the case
of the contract strategy, the collection of cost data is
straightforward. Sufficient data can be garnered from
contractor responses to an RFP, assuming that management
requirements are adequately stated in the solicitation.
The hybrid strategy, on the other hand, presents a
more complex issue. In order to develop sufficient cost
data to facilitate any cost-benefit analysis, a hybrid
strategy must be formulated which will meet NATS management
requirements. Only after this hybrid strategy is developed
can accurate parameters be identified to assess management,
maintenance, hardware, services and support costs. It is
toward this end, the identification of management
21
requirements and the formulation of procedures to fulfill
these requirements, that the closed system approach is
focused. With the strategy formulated, it becomes only an
exercise in economic analysis to develop the cost parameters
of the hybrid approach for comparison with the contract
strategy, with the ultimate goal of pinpointing the most
cost-effective method of NATS management.
22
III. THE CLOSED SYSTEM VARIABLES
A. MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK EVOLUTION
The closed system approach is naturally centered upon
the system's internal environment due to the classical and
neoclassical theories' postulation that the organization is
independent of its external environment. In reality, it is
impossible to totally segregate these internal variables,
since, over time, environmental factors have influenced the
internal environment. However, for presentation purposes,
the closed and open system approaches will be addressed
separately, with environmental influences being presented as
such.
One of the key internal NATS variables is the management
framework existing at the time of the shift of NATS respon-
sibility to C0MNAVTE1C0M. To understand this framework, it
is necessary to review some of the historical factors which
influenced its evolution.
1 . Hist orical ly Sjaeaking,
Management policy for administrative telephones was
the product of a long and close relationship between the
Navy and American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) , a
relationship that flourished by virtue of AT&T's status as a
de facto monopolist. Not only did AT&T provide for all of
the Navy's requirements in the realm of telephone equipment
and service, but the Bell System played a vital role in
research and development and was instrumental in many
advances in Naval telecommunications [Ref. 20: pp. 21-25]:
a) 1915:
- Transatlantic radio communications were established
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using a Navy antenna at Arlington, Virginia and Bell
System amplifiers
- The first Naval order ever sent by radiotelephone
was transmitted from Washington, D. C. to the
Brooklyn Navy Yard by Josephus Daniels, Secretary of
the Navy
b) 1916: The Bell System financed and conducted a
national mobilization test for the Navy during which:
- Ail Navy yards were connected via telephone circuits
to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, simu-
lating wartime readiness
- Bell System engineers installed radiotelephone
equipment onboard the DSS New Hampshire and using
Navy transmitters at Arlington, Virginia and Navy
receivers at Norfolk, successfully demonstrated
long-distance radiotelephone communications
- Using a combination of Navy radio stations and Bell
System facilities the Navy established satisfactory
communications between Washington, D. C. and the
Panama Canal Zone; Hare Island, California; and
Honolulu, Hawaii
c) World War II:
- Bell Laboratories were involved in over two thousand
military projects
- Western Electric, the Bell System manufacturing
subsidiary, produced radar and gun director systems,
communications equipment, sonar, magnetic mines,
acoustic torpedoes and proximity fuses for the Navy
The list continues with such examples as the
Automatic Voice Network (AOTOVON) , which was developed and
built by the Bell System. AUTOVON was the first switched
military telephone network and is the world's largest
private network. With such close cooperation between ATST
and the Department of the Navy and considering the industry
24
status of ATST as the de facto monopolist, the management
strategy adopted for administrative telephones was a natural
outcome.
2- The Traditional Approach
The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) has assigned the
responsibility for providing telecommunications service for
Naval Forces to the Chief of Naval Operations [Bef. 21]. In
discharging this responsibility, the CNO functions through a
multileveled staff and has delegated authority for differing
subsets of telecommunications services to subordinate second
and third echelon commands- Figure 1.1 illustrates the
hierarchical structure established within the Navy to meet
the reguireaents of providing telecommunications service for
Naval Forces.
Management responsibilities for administrative tele-
phone services were vested in the Chief of Naval Material
and his subordinate third-echelon command, the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) . The responsibili-
ties assigned to the Chief of Naval Material include tasking
for the review, approval and contracting for administrative
telephone services and facilities. Responsibilities enumer-
ated include [ Ref . 1 : p. 4]:
a) Validating requirements and approving changes to
existing telephone systems and ownership
b) Establishing standards and procedures for the manage-
ment of administrative telephone service
c) Executing contracts for telephone systems and services
in accordance with current Navy procurement directives
d) Reviewing currently published standards and proce-
dures, including technical requirements for interface
with AUTOVON, for operation and maintenance of admin-
istrative telephone facilities and services and to
promulgate changes as necessary to ensure maintenance
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of quality levels equivalent to good commercial
practices.
The basic Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) and NAVFAC
management policies for administrative telephones are
contained in References 22 and 23. The procedures employed
were basically user initiated in that all leased or
purchased services and equipment were procured upon request
of the user.
At the local level, the base telephone manager,
normally a member of the Public Works Center (PHC) organiza-
tion, received user requests and in accordance with NAVFAC
established procedures, obtained the required service and/or
equipment by contacting either the local Bell operating
company (BOC) , the independent operating company (IOC) or
the AT&T representative and satisfying the requirement using
a standard communications services authorization (CSA) . The
CSA obligated funds against a standing contract which either
NAVFAC or the Defense Commercial Communications Office
(DECCO) 7 had previously negotiated. Either the BOC/IOC or
AT&T would then perform all necessary coordination needed to
implement the request. This method was authorized for all
acquisitions below a one-thousand-dollar threshold and since
most user requests fell below threshold, it proved respon-
sive to requirements. [Ref. 20: p. 70]
Ihe procurement of services and/or equipment above
the cne-thousand-dollar threshold required that the base
telephone manager forward the CSA to the next echelon, the
regional field division of the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command. The regional division, of which there are six,
would contact AT&T who would research the requirement an 1
7 DECC0. an arm of the Defense Communications Agency
(DCA) , is tasked with all contracting functions for long-
line services throughout DOD just as G5A performs similar
contracting functions for the remainder of the Federal
Government.
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advise the field division whether it would be cheaper to go
to the local phone company for connectivity with the long
distance carrier's switch, or whether it would be cheaper
for DECCO (located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois) to
procure the service via a general contract. WATS services
and long distance services other than direct dial, common
carrier were obtained via the same procedures.
Thus, for most telephone requirements, the base
telephone manager used the CSA, based on the general
standing contracts which the Engineering Commands or DZCCO
had previously arranged. It is important to note AT&T's
degree of management involvement in the total process. AT&T
researched the feasibility and cost of providing user
service and recommended the proper avenue to meet the user
requirement. AT&T contracts provided not only service but
also maintenance, end-to-end connectivity, installation, and
the management to coordinate these efforts.
3 . Adapt ing. to Change
Increased industry competition produced changes in
the management policy for telephone equipment. The most
significant of these changes was instituted by a policy
letter originated by DECCO in 1981 [ Ref . 24], as a result of
increasing equipment competition within the industry after
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Computer Inquiry
II Decision. Due to its significance as an initial Defense
Department response to increased competition within a
segment of the telecommunications industry, the provisions
of the DECCO letter are presented in detail [Ref. 20: pp.
72-75]:
a) All new, deregulated customer premises equipment (CPE)
is, by definition, eligible for competition in the
absence of specific sole source justification to the
contrary
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b) Embedded equipment and equipment in the telephone
companies 1 inventories as of December 31, 1982, can be
offered under tariff until all CPE is deregulated
c) All major CPE used to provide enhanced service is now
to be considered eligible for competition and the
appropriate procedures for securing competition stated
in the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAE) B must be
followed
d) For requirements which will result in a total obliga-
tion greater than ten thousand dollars, unless
detailed justification can be provided explaining why
only a sole source can provide the equipment or
service, the customer must submit a performance work
statement with the telecommunications service request
(TSE) 9 in order that DECCO can properly summarize the
requirement for publication in the Commerce Busines s
Daily and issue a formal solicitation to industry
e) While the customer may feel less than qualified to
write a DAE performance work statement, DECCO
considers it the key to good acquisition action- It
is the base upon which proposals are developed and
offered, negotiations conducted, the contract awarded,
and criteria set by which the government can determine
if stated requirements will be met. A poorly written
performance work statement can mean disaster for the
customer and many headaches for the contracting
officer.
Decco suggested five functions which are satisfied
by the performance work statement:
on
^Superceded by the Federal Acquisition Eegulations (FAR)




9 The format and submission procedures for the TSE areibed in reference 25.
1. It communicates to industry what is required to be
responsive to the solicitation
2. It serves as the basis for the technical evaluation
of alternative solutions offered by industry to meet
stated requirements
3. It serves as the foundation for either accepting or
rejecting delivered supplies or service
4. It serves as the basis on which to determine if
equipment performs correctly once in service
5. It defines what the government should be getting for
what it is spending.
The DECCO letter offered the following guidelines to
supplement the DAR instructions for preparation of these
performance work statements:
a) The performance work statement should be written in
clear, unambiguous terms. Verbiage should be
critiqued for meaning prior to inclusion. If a
particular description is unclear, it should be
rewritten until there can only be one reasonable
interpretation by all parties
b) A middle-of-the-road attitude must be taken with
regard to flexibility. If the performance work state-
ment is too broad the contractor may deliver a product
that does not satisfy the customer's needs, but the
government may be forced to accept it. Conversely,
rigid, restrictive parameters inhibit a contractor's
creativity and innovative effort, restrict competi-
tion, and may result in sustainable protests
c) The performance work statement should be written in
conventional language to the extent possible without
sacrificing the technical specifics needed to define
performance parameters. Frequently, diagrams or sche-
matics which illustrate how and where desired equip-
ment will operate and with what it must interface are
helpful
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d) Properly dated and pertinent reference documents
should be attached to the performance work statement,
or a statement included to advise where such documents
can be obtained
e) The user should determine if military or federal spec-
ifications are applicable and available
f) General and background information should be clearly
separated from directions and contractor responsibili-
ties
g) The period of performance or delivery schedule should
be accurately specified in terms of dates or elapsed
time
h) Proper quantities must be shown
i) The user should determine if the equipment will
produce results consistent with project objectives.
The user, when acquiring major competitive CPE, must
also furnish DECCO with a technical evaluation plan tailored
to the performance work statement to include the following:
a) The basis for award, i.e., the framework within which
the government intends to evaluate proposals and award
a contract
b) A list of evaluation criteria (factors and subfactors)
and their relative order of importance
c) A narrative description of what the government expects
to review within the factors and subfactors
d) Identification of any factor or subfactor of such a
critical importance that an unsatisfactory rating
could render a proposal technically nonresponsive
e) Information to offerers on the format and content of
offers or proposals needed for evaluation
f) Information for the contracting officer such as tech-
nical evaluation techniques, rationale for evaluation
factors, and specific weights (if any) to be assigned
to the factors and subfactors
30
g) Anticipated system or equipment service life
h) Information as to whether or not a purchase option is
desired and how it will be evaluated.
The major change initiated by this letter was the
implementation of a fully competitive acquisition policy
with respect to teleccmmunica tions equipment. No longer
would sole source procurement from AT&T be the norm.
Instead, all telecommunications equipment was to be procured
in accordance with the appropriate competitive procurement
procedures specified in the DAB.
The second major provision of the DECCO letter was
the requirement that for any equipment procurement in excess
of ten thousand dollars, the requesting activity had to
submit to DECCO a performance work statement (as detailed in
the DAE) , along with a technical evaluation plan tailored to
the performance work statement, so that DECCO could summa-
rize the requirement for publication of the solicitation for
bids in the Commerce Business Daily.
This initial DOD reaction to the changing face of
the telecommunications industry followed the spirit of the
Carlucci initiatives, 10 in that it required fully competi-
tive equipment procurement. More significantly, the DECCO
response placed the burden of writing performance work
statements and technical evaluation plans upon the origi-
nator of the request (in most cases the base telephone
manager) . This approach was similar to that of the
Commercial Activities Program, with the exception that no
management study was mandated. Thus, the formulation of the
PWS , which, under the Commercial Activities Program, is
considered "... a time-consuming process requiring a
l0Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci
initiated a wide range of changes within DOD acquisition
programs in 1981. These changes, commonly referred to as
the "Carlucci initiatives" formed the basis of the DOD
Acquisition Improvement Program. Reference 26 contains a
detailed analysis of these changes.
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considerable level of expertise in the functional area under
consideration as well as the various aspects of the
contracting process" [Bef- 11: p. IV-19], was left to the
local telephone manager.
In summary, the need to react to a changing environ-
ment was recognized hut the procedure initiated to satisfy
this need left the local telephone manager only limited
options, among them: to try to develop an accurate PWS and
technical evaluation plan (which, if feasible, could take a
year or longer to accomplish) , or to contract for private
sector consulting services to develop the PWS and technical
evaluation plan (which could cost as much, or more, than the
needed equipment). Again, this demonstrates the difficulty
of the closed system to react to rapidly changing
environments.
4. The Transition Peri od
According to preliminary information, the basic
acquisition policy will remain unchanged during the tran-
sition period [Bef- 27]. The one thousand dollar threshold
for local procurement will remain in effect. However, for
long-line services (those circuits beyond fifty miles) all
requests will be submitted to DECCO via COMNAVTELCOH.
Additionally, regional one-year installation and maintenance
contracts (with two, one-year renewal options) have been
competitively awarded by all six of the regional NAVFAC
field divisions to cover all local installation and mainte-
nance requirements. Thus the transition procedures will
retain the local threshold but installation and maintenance
contracting is centralized at the regional level and DECCO
will perform the contracting for all long-line services.
32
B. SISTEM VARIABLES
1 . Topogr aph y
The Navy Administrative Telephone System services
some 162 major bases and activities throughout the world
[Ref. 28]. In addition to these major installations, tele-
phone service is essential to hundreds of Recruiting
Stations, Reserve Centers, depots and small independent
facilities in metropolitan areas and rural settings
throughout the United States. From this perspective, NATS
can be viewed as a collection of independent nodes of
varying size located throughout the world, each requiring
connectivity with commercial, Defense, Federal and national
networks.
Node size and location are both determinants of
local NATS requirements and service availability.
Requirements are directly proportional to node size, i.e.
major installations' traffic volumes and customer-base size
necessitate switching capability, whereas small recruiting
offices may require nothing more than a single- line tele-
phone instrument. Service availability is a function of
node location. In the continental United States a wide
variety of services are available from commercial vendors.
In addition to trunk line connections to local exchanges for
accessing the public switched network (PSN) , a variety of
specialized common carrier (SCC) * l services are available as
well. In Alaska and Hawaii, as well as some U.S.
Territories, the availability of SCC services is somewhat
more limited but SCC services still present viable options
for connectivity to commercial networks.
in




NATS nodes situated overseas face different connec-
tivity issues. Access to SCC-type services, in most
instances, is unavailable. The quality and reliability of
commercial service varies from country to country but, in
most cases, is inferior to what is considered the norm in
the U.S. Additional considerations arise from the multitude
of host nation agreements negotiated with the governments in
the countries where NATS nodes are situated. These are some
of the factors which have influenced a greater dependency
upon Defense Communications System (DCS) services, such as
AUTO VON, to provide connectivity for overseas NATS nodes.
The final aspect which must be addressed is node
stability. The majority of NATS nodes are fixed installa-
tions and can be considered stable except for the infrequent
occurrence of base closures or more infrequent openings.
However, a small percentage of the nodes, primarily those of
small recruiting offices, etc. , are unstable, in that relo-
cation is commonplace, as these offices react to demographic
shifts.
2 . Hardware
The NATS hardware base is comprised of 385 switch-
boards or consoles servicing some 320,000 instruments.
Approximately 87 percent of the switches and consoles are
analog devices. At major installations, 88 percent ( 1 42 of
the 162) of the switchboards or consoles are leased. The
predominant characteristic of the hardware base is its age.
Host of the plant is cf World war II vintage (19 40-1950) and
in desperate need of modernization. The same is true of the
cable plant and cable support structures. [ Ref . 28]
The other aspect of the hardware base (or imbedded
CPE) which warrants discussion is the status of the cable
plant itself. As discussed in the Regulatory section which
follows, embedded CPE went to AT&T ownership as part of the
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divestiture agreement, while intrasystem wiring became a BOC
asset. Thus, embedded CPE issues are subject to AT&T policy
while cable plant issues are subject to twenty-two different
policies established by the BOCs.
3 . Personnel
At the installation level, local telephone manage-
ment personnel have functioned within the PWC organizations
and have dealt with NATS management as with other utility
services. Due to past reliance upon the 3ell System, these
personnel are basically unskilled in the multiplicity of
tasks involved in telephone system management. This lack of
experience is even more evident at small installations which
have traditionally been totally reliant upon AT&T.
At higher levels of the NATS management hierarchy
this same dependency upon AT&T has resulted in a dearth of
expertise in the areas of system planning, design, engi-
neering and inspection (functions traditionally provided by
AT&T) [Eef. 28]. Although personnel at the higher echelons
are more familiar with the industry as a result of dealing
with hardware and services leases and contracts, it is
evident that the current lack of expertise in non-
contracting areas is noteworthy.
4 . Node Siz e
NATS requirements derive from the inherent support
mission of the system and thus are nodal in nature.
Requirements at each node stem from the mission and scope of
that installation. Requirements can be categorized as
internal and external. Internal requirements are estab-
lished by tenants at the node. Qser requirements such as
number and type of terminal equipment (which dictates the
scope of the cable plant and switching requirements) are
functions of the geographic and demographic features of the
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local installation. Thus, a low population density, widely
dispersed at an installation would dictate different
requirements than a geographically concentrated, heavily
populated site.
External requirements flow directly from the
internal requirements. From a supporting-role view, the
size and type of trunk line connections to the local
exchange as well as SCC access lines into the PSN and trunk
line access to DCS and NCS networks, such as AUTOVON and
FTS, respectively, are directly attributable to the nature
and scope of on-base requirements, i.e. the number of terni-
nals, size of cable plant and traffic volume required at the
installation level.
Thus, the size of the individual NATS node is
totally dictated by the level of administrative telephone
support required at the installation. Equipment, cable
plant and trunk line requirements at each node have been
established over time as a function of user requests. As
bases or activities have expanded and user requirements have
increased, local nodes have expanded in a discrete fashion,
i.e., the number of terminals and the supporting cable plant
has expanded to the point of saturating local switching
capacity, at which time excess demand would dictate major
expansion of switching capabilities. Just as each activi-
ty's growth rate has varied, so too, has the size of NATS
nodes.
C. SYNOPSIS
This chapter has outlined the traditional approach to
NATS management and discussed the internal variables which
are significant to the closed system approach. From this
discussion it follows that NATS management must fulfill the
traditional responsibilities of validating requirements and
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approving changes; establishing maintenance and management
standards and procedures; and contract execution functions.
In meeting these responsibilities, the system variables must
be incorporated. A management strategy must consider node
size variations, location factors, personnel training
levels, and modernization reguirements dictated by an aging
hardware base. This represents a complex task for the
closed system approach.
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IV. THE OPEN SYSTEM VARIABLES
The open system approach asserts that the organization
is not independent of its environment but that, indeed, the
environment is a major influence upon the organization. It
is therefore necessary to examine the major environmental
variables active in the telecommunications arena.
A. REGULATORY
The January 8, 1982 announcement of a settlement in the
antitrust lawsuit filed against AT&T by the Justice
Department on November 20, 1974, marked the end of the Bell
System as it had come to be known. This action, commonly
referred to as 'deregulation' should more accurately be
called 'divestiture', since one of the main provisions of
the settlement agreement was AT&T's divestiture of the
twenty-two Bell operating companies (BOCs) . Indeed, deregu-
lation is a misnomer, since as one analyst put it,
"Ironically, competitive entry is creating the need for
additional regulatory responses, mainly to facilitate the
competitive market structure..." [Ref. 29]- The
Comptroller General, addressing the impact of eguipment
competition, detailed this need for increased regulation in
his 1981 report to Congress: "Due to rapid technological
change, the domestic common carrier telecommunications
industry is in transition from a highly monopolized struc-
ture to a more competitive one. Reacting to this techno-
logical change, the Federal Communications Commission,
supported by the courts, has issued a series of decisions
allowing competition. This, however, has created a need for
the Commission to expand its regulatory approach to assure
fair competition" [Ref. 30].
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Although the divestiture, in and of itself, is signifi-
cant in that it marked the breakup of one of the world's
largest corporations, it is more significant when put into
the context of thirty years of regulatory forces which
spurred competition within the industry.
The principal regulatory agency of the telephone
industry is the Federal Communications Commission which was
created by the Communications Act of 1934. The FCC's
license is derived from a 'public interest' standard
embodied in Title I of the 1934 Act [Ref. 31: p. v]. The
other main agent for regulatory control is the Justice
Department (DOJ) , whose powers stem from application of
antitrust laws.
Initially, the regulatory environment was relatively
quiet. However, this fifteen year lull following the
creation of the FCC was but the calm before the storm. In
1949, antitrust litigation was filed by the DOJ against
AT&T, signalling the onslaught of regulatory attacks upon
the traditional view cf the industry as a natural monopoly.
In 1956 two key regulatory actions further exemplified this
regulatory trend- The first of these actions was the
Consent Agreement between the Justice Department and AT&T in
settlement of the antitrust litigation initiated in 1949.
The agreement limited AT&T and Western Electric (AT&T's
equipment manufacturing subsidiary) to conducting business
solely in the regulated telecommunications arena. This
consent decree would later form the basis of the 1982
'divestiture' agreement between the Justice Department and
AT&T. The second 1956 action involved the Hush-a-Phone
Company's attempt to market an attachment to telephone hand-
sets which reduced background noise levels. The FCC ruled
that no attachments could be made to Bell System equipment
except by AT&T due to the hazard of potential damage to the
system. This ruling, however, was overturned by the Court
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of Appeals [Ref. 32] and thus, marked the beginning of
competition in the equipment market.
Three years later the FCC issued its first major ruling
against AT&T in its Above 890 Decision, which permitted the
construction of private microwave networks using frequencies
above 890 Megahertz (Mhz) . Although these private networks
could not interconnect with the Bell System, they did repre-
sent direct competition for AT&T. This 1959 FCC position
that "...extended eligibility will afford a competitive spur
to the manufacturing of equipment and in the development of
the communications art" [Ref. 33: p. 81] established a
policy that the FCC would pursue for the next twenty-five
years; a policy cf increasing competition within the
industry for the good of the 'public interest*.
Key regulatory actions of this pre-divestiture period
serve to more clearly delineate the pro-competition trend:
a) 1965 - First Computer Inquiry
The FCC concluded that the existing telephone communi-
cations capabilities could not support the rapidly
expanding needs of computer users. Therefore, special
private line capabilities were needed for many data
communications applications. [Ref. 20: p. 50]
b) 1968 - Carterfone Decision
The FCC ruled that "ATST could not unreasonably
prohibit the connection of terminal equipment manufac-
tured by AT&T's competitors to the telephone system"
[Ref- 34: p. 2]. This ruling's importance lies in
the fact that it permitted non-telephone equipment
interconnection with the Bell network, since the
Carterfone was a terminal connector tor mobile radios.
c) 1971- Specialized Common Carrier (SCC) Decision
The FCC ruled that private line, inter-city common
carriers could interconnect with the local Bell System
exchanges. [Ref. 20: p. 28]
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d) 1961 - Computer Inquiry II Decision 12
The FCC ruled that all telecommunications equipment,
including telephones and computer-augmented communica-
tions services, would be sold on a competitive,
unregulated basis. This left basically only telephone
transmission services under the fully regulated
category. [Bef. 20: p. 51]
In 1982 Congress, recognizing the Federal Communications
Commission's new role as a catalyst of change, passed legis-
lation adding a new section (Section 7) to the
Communications Act of 1934. As the Defense Commissioner of
the FCC, Mimi weyforth Dawson, interpreted this
Congressional action, Section 7 provided an explicit mandate
for the Commission tc "... promote growth and innovation, to
get new services on-line and to bring their benefits to the
American people" [Bef- 35].
The 1932 Consent Agreement was, in actuality, a
Modification of Final Judgement (MFJ) in Civil Action 17-49,
United S tates v Western Electr ic Co., Inc., et al. This
suit, originally filed by the Justice Department in 1949,
had been settled by Consent Agreement with AT&T in 1956, as
previously discussed. On November 20, 1974 the Justice
Department again filed suit against AT&T for alleged viola-
tions of antitrust laws. Again, this suit was settled by
Consent Agreement, however, as part of the settlement, AT&T
won relief from most of the provisions of the 1956 agree-
ment. Therefore, the final judgement of that 1956 Consent
Agreement had to be mcdified. Specific aspects of the MFJ
were as follows [Eef. 31: pp. 22-23]:
1. The twenty-two 3ell operating companies (BOCs) in
which AT&T had majority ownership were divested from
AT&T in a spin-off
12 A series of decisions issued in April and December,
1980, and October 1981.
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2. The license contract agreements between AT&T and the
BOCs were terminated
3. The standard supplies contracts between the BOCs and
the Western Electric Company were terminated
4. A central point of government contact for all BOCs on
National Security/Emergency Preparedness was required
and BOCs can provide emergency telephone service
5. BOCs can provide only local distribution telecommuni-
cations service
6. AT&T assumed control and ownership of all inter-
exchange facilities and services
7. AT&T can own and provide customer premises equipment
(CFE) on an unregulated competitive basis
8. The 1956 Consent Decree was replaced in its entirety
9. AT&T was to provide a reorganization plan for Justice
Department approval within six months from the date
of the court order
10. The BOCs can order, on a priority basis, from AT&T,
the Western Electric Company and the Bell Telephone
Laboratories, research and development, manufactured
and supporting services until September 1, 1987
11. The agreement recognized each BOC as a local distri-
bution monopoly
12. BOCs could be consolidated or remain apart.
In accordance with these provisions, a reorganization
plan was approved which created seven, separate local
exchange or regional holding companies, each comprised of
one or more of the twenty-two BOCs. Each of these seven
local exchange companies consists of local access and trans-
port areas (LATAs) of which there are 16 1 nationwide. All
calls between LATAs are required to be routed through the
long distance carriers.
The final regulatory note in the divestiture agreement
aimed at ensuring fair competition was the requirement that
42
by the end of 1986, the BOCs were to provide equal access to
the local switching facilities- ATST already anjoyed hard-
wired connections to the local switches which permitted
accessing ATST long distance services by simply dialing a
single digit. The divestiture agreement mandated that other
common carriers should be provided connections equal to
those of ATST [ Hef - 36]. Although the equal access program
got off to a slow start in 1984 with only 830 local
exchanges being brought into conformity, it is estimated
that half of the local exchanges (approximately 5,000) in
the U.S. will be converted during 1985, with the remainder
being converted ahead of the 1986 deadline [ Ref . 37].
Thus, ATST was divested of any local telephone opera-
tions but did maintain its entire inter-city network which
provides both interstate and intrastate long distance
service; its equipment, both telephones and switchboards, 13
its Western Electric manufacturing subsidiary; Bell
Telephone Laboratories, its research subsidiary; and its
International Division [Bef. 20: p. 58], In other words,
ATST became just another long distance supplier in the
competitive inter-exchange carrier (IXC) market, albeit by
far the largest, and just another equipment supplier in the
competitive customer premises equipment (CPE) market while
the BOCs and IOCs, functioning as local distribution monopo-
lies, must deal with competitors on both the input (CPE and
enhanced services) side and on the output (IXC) side of each
local exchange.
At the present time, except for the local operating
companies (which are sanctioned local distribution monopo-
lies) , full competition permeates every aspect of the tele-
communications market. In keeping with the Carlucci
1
3
These include class 1 (the twelve largest regional
switchboards) through class 4 (the second smallest class of
switchboards in a telephone network)
.
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initiatives, competitive procurement procedures must be used
throughout the administrative telephone system in order to
maximize the purchasing power of the communications dollar.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL
1 . Ind ust r y-Wide
The shift to a competitive market structure within
the telecommunications industry has cleared the way for the
inevitable merger ox computer and telecommunications tech-
nologies. The rush of new entrants into this combined
market during 19 84 alone serves to demonstrate that not only
is this merger inevitable, but that it may portend even more
sophisticated technologies for the future.
The unregulated umbrella organization for AT&T
Information Systems and Bell Laboratories (AT&T Technologies
Inc.) announced the introduction of the Safari Series of
microcomputers, the 3B Series of minicomputers, the
Information Systems Network (ISN) and substantial enhance-
ments to the System 85 PBX during 1984. The AT&T
Technologies Inc. announcement of a planned $2.5 billion
investment in System 85 enhancements over the next five
years along with the introduction of the ISN local area
network (LAN) indicate a significant move by the parent AT&T
organization into the office automation arena. [2ef. 38]
luring 1984, fourteen of the twenty-two BOCs filed
waiver requests with the FCC for exemption from the provi-
sions of the Computer Inquiry II Decision. The BOCs
requested permission to provide enhanced services such as
packet switching and protocol conversion as part of the BOC
basic network service. Although no decision was rendered by
the PCC on the request, initial indications are that the
request will be favorably endorsed by the Commission.
[Refs. 38,39]
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In October, the North American Telecommunications
Association, a group of over 600 telephone equipment manu-
facturers, lodged a complaint with the FCC against the BOCs.
The association charged that the BOC expansion of Centrex
(Central Exchange) services to include stored- program-
control (call forwarding, call waiting, etc.) and interac-
tive computer services was an abuse of the BOC local service
monopoly status. The BOC counter to this charge was that
they could not effectively compete in the marketplace and
retain current Centrex customers without enhancing the
Centrex offerings. The Centrex customers that the BOCs are
worried about losing include over two-thirds of the nation's
100 largest companies. [Eef. 40]
1984 saw ITT Corporation, the world's largest
conglomerate, announce its move into the U.S. telecommunica-
tions equipment market (which represents more than one-third
of the worldwide market). Chairman Rand V. Araskog's plans
for ITT envision adapting its vaunted System 12 European
switching technology to the U.S. market and capitalizing on
its advanced technology to develop a host of office automa-
tion equipment. In Araskog's view, "... the U.S. telecommu-
nications market is up for grabs since the Bell System
breakup." [Eef. 41]
In September, IBM's $2.25 billion takeover of Eolm
Corporation, an industry leader in digital PBXs, 1 * heralded
the computer giant's foray into the office automation
jungle. Even before the takeover, Rolm had foreseen the
technology merging and had anticipated realizing as much as
half of its future revenues from a series of PBX add-on
1AThe PBX is widely acclaimed as the business communica-
tions hub of the future, providing interconnect! vity for
telephones, computers, printers and other office equipment
using its telephone lines. In recent usage, the terms PA3X
and PBX are used interchangeably since, from an industry
standpoint, all modern private branch exchanges are
automatic.
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features such as electronic mail and desktop workstations.
The IBM-Rclm effort will undoubtedly have a significant
impact upon the industry. As Robert C. Fleming, an analyst
with Gartner Group Inc. (an IBM-watcher) , states,
"Strategically, IBM sees voice and data in a single box as
its future, too, and eventually will want control of all the
pieces » [Refs. 42,43]
Northern Telecom Ltd., the Canadian telecommunica-
tions equipment manufacturer, saw its 1934 sales of PBXs
increase approximately 30 percent over its 15.7 percent
market share for 1983. The U.S. Integrated Office Systems
Division of Northern introduced four new models of its
staple SI-1 PBX during the year and the division's annual
research and development budget topped $100 million.
[Ref. 44]
Northern Telecom and ATST research and development
expenditures during 1984 only hint at the magnitude of the
total R&D efforts of the private sector. For example, MCI
Communications Corporation spent over S20 million per week
during 1984 in expanding its network using the latest in
technology in an effort to gain a competitive edge over AT&T
with the efficiencies of its modern network [Ref. 45]. The
1984 estimate for RSD expenditures at ITT was $1 billion
[Ref. 41]. It is safe to conclude that survival in this
competitive market hinges on keeping pace with the tech-
nology through large R&D budgets. This short term reality
is somewhat opposed to what some analysts' long-term fore-
casts had predicted- As one study conducted for DCA in 1980
foresaw, the long-term effects would include an increase in
competition for equipment manufacturers, however marginal
consumer benefit would result due to higher equipment unit
costs and relative normalization of equipment pricing struc-
tures. The study went on to forecast increases in intra-
and interstate as well as local rates, heavy price increases
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in Bell- provided business services, deceleration of techno-
logical growth due to decreased control over high-cost
technology R&D and manufacture, a substantial overall infla-
tionary pressure on the domestic telecommunications
industry, and the deferment of technological innovation
[fief. 46: pp. 4-6]. The rush of competitors into the market
has, for the short term at least, spurred rather than
suppressed technological growth. It remains to be seen what
the effects will be for the long term, after the major
equipment market peaks in the 1987 time frame, as analysts
currently predict.
2 • Market Niches
In addition to the marriage of computer and telecom-
munications technologies, the forces of a competitive market
are producing new technologies in segments or niches within
the industry. Again, using 1984 as a base year, it can be
seen that in the short run at least, competition is spurring
a technological onslaught.
a. Voice Mail
The public voice mail niche saw three new
entrants during the year. American Express Company, GTE
Corporation and Voice Mail International Inc. introduced
their entries into the market. Voice mail uses computers to
record, store and forward voice messages either in conjunc-
tion with an office PBX for internal distribution or with a
central computer accessed via the public switched network.
[Ref. 47]
The spread of this new capability within the DOD
has been rapid. For example, the Air Force Communications
Command (AFCC) is currently using voice messaging service in
its operations throughout the U.S., Europe and the Pacific
basin. Overseas access to the service is via AUTOVON
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connection to Carswell Air Force Base in Texas, where
callers are patched through to the local commercial network
for entry into the system. Similarly, the Joint Tactical
Fusion Program Management Office is using voice messaging to
maintain constant information flow between varied locations,
regardless of time zone or personnel availability considera-
tions. The cost savings resulting from elimination of
written communications plus the remarkable increases in
productivity realized by permitting communications 24 hours
a day, seven days a week, irrespective of time and location,
indicates that the demand for this service will expand
within DOD. [ Bef . 48]
b. Electronic Hail
AT&T joined MCI Communications Corporation and
Western Union Corp. in the $100 million electronic mail
(EMAIL) market. ATST's entry into the market (a market
which is growing at a 50 percent annual rate) will not only
provide electronic mailbox services for personal computer
access but will also permit message retrieval via the PSN.
This service, known as AT&T Mail, will use computer-
generated voices to read mailbox messages to users via their
telephone. [Eef. 49]
The DOD is already heavily involved with elec-
tronic mail services. The Navy Research Laboratory (NEL)
operates the Navy Electronic Mail Service (NEMS) which
provides service to every NRL site. The Naval Data
Automation Command (HAVDAC) manages the Naval Regional Data
Automation Center (NARDAC) Network (NARDACNET) which is
purchasing up to ninety-nine electronic mailservers to
provide EMAIL support service. These electronic mailservers
are expected to be on line by the end of 1985. Defense Data
Network (DDN) electronic mail (DDNMail) mailservers (owned
by DCA) are currently operating at maximum capacity and the
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growth in demand is expected to far outstrip the network
expansion.
These examples illustrate the widespread use of
electronic mail within the DOD. This proliferation is
remarkable since, as Rod Richardson (former DDK Project
Management Office, Navy Systems Implementor) phrased it,
"EMail is used by nearly every manager in DOD but there are
no guidelines to govern its growth or use." He went on to
say that EMail use "... is not even covered by DOD policy or
guidance letter." [Ref. 50]
c. Video Teleconferencing
Technological advances enabled the production of
new code compression (codec) devices (devices permitting the
digital encoding and compression of TV signals) during the
year. Windergren Communications Inc., of Campbell, Calif.,
began marketing these low-speed codecs in June, 1984. These
new devices will enable video teleconferencing using moving
color video over standard telephone lines at a drastically
reduced rate of 56,000 bits per second (bps). 15 Illinois
Bell Telephone Company began offering this low speed digital
service in late 1984. [Ref. 51]
In December 1984, COMSAT General Corporation was
awarded a $2.9 million contract for the design and fabrica-
tion of three full-motion color video teleconferencing
systems to link the Naval Sea Systems Command Headguarters
in Arlington, Va. with Naval Underwater Systems Center
research laboratories in Newport, R.I. and New London, Ct.
These systems are scheduled to be operational in mid- 1985.
The stated goals of using these three systems are: (1) more
efficient and productive use of engineers and scientists by
15?revious teleconferencing services used dedicated
transmission lines with transmission rates of 1.54 million
bps.
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improving communications between dispersed groups working on
common technical programs; (2) enhancement of management
meetings and technical conferences through greater partici-
pation by employees unable to attend due to scheduling
conflicts or travel limitations; and (3) reduction of
manpower losses due to travel time and a significant cost
savings in travel and associated expenses. [Ref. 52]
Again, the list can be continued with advances
in fiber-optic technology fostering the growth of new market
niches in transmission systems [ Ref s. 53 # 54], while tele-
phone companies moved into the arena of cable television
system installation and maintenance. [Ref. 55]
These examples serve to illustrate the changing
face of the telecommunications industry. Due to the strong
competitive currents in the industry it is anticipated that,
at least in the near term, large research and development
expenditures will continue to pave the way for industry
expansion and growth along the frontiers of changing tech-
nology. As these new technologies emerge, it is anticipated
that Navy and DOD expansion into these niches will continue.
C. MONETARY
The enthusiasm generated by the lure of new technology,
as discussed in the preceding section, is guickly dampened
by the reality of the monetary factors and budgetary
constraints imposed upon NATS management options.
Traditionally, the COMN AVTELCOH budget has averaged
approximately 4 percent of the total Navy budget. Since
funding for NATS has been handled primarily under the
Communications Services Industrial Fund (CSIF) , the shift of
NATS management responsibility to COMNAVTELCOH does not
imply any major reallocation of financial resources within
the Department of the Navy.
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Even though the financing of NATS expenses through the
CSIF tends to make its costs less visible, it is essential
to understand the magnitude of the costs involved. For
example, the combined DOD budget for fiscal year (FY) 1984
allocated $1.3 billion for combined local and long distance
telephone expenses and an additional $2 billion for equip-
ment purchases, support and related costs [Ref. 56]. The
Navy's direct lease costs for equipment are approximately
$125 million annually and the overall leased telecommunica-
tions services costs to the Navy are in the range of $250
million annually [Eef. 28]. These direct lease costs are
expected to continue to escalate, although a respite was
gained in June 1984 when the FCC declared a one-year morato-
rium on rate increases for ATST-owned embedded equipment.
The Commission was distraught over a steady stream of price
hikes by AT&T Information Systems, the unregulated division
who inherited the Bell System embedded equipment base after
the divestiture [Ref. 38], and so, temporarily, halted
further rate hikes.
The imposition of access charges in 1984 as part of the
price restructuring effort within the industry have directly
impacted NATS costs. The first of these monthly access
charges, $6.00 per line, was levied against multiline busi-
ness subscribers on 25 May. This same monthly charge was
also applied to Centrex customers whose lines were ordered
or installed after July 27, 1983, while Centrex customers
who beat this deadline were assessed a reduced monthly
charge of $2.00 per line. [Ref. 38]
The final fee levied by the FCC during 1984 was a $25.00
per line monthly surcharge for interstate private line
users. This surcharge was directed at discouraging bypass.
Bypass occurs where interstate private lines connected to
PABXs are used to carry interstate calls, thus bypassing the
local network on either or both ends of the termination.
[Ref. 29]
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The rate structure fluctuations during 1984 were mixed.
Although AT&T long distance rates dropped by 6. 1 percent in
May following an FCC order [Ref. 57], local service rates
increased an average 24 percent nationwide on the year
[Ref. 58].
Although AT&T long distance rates were lowered in May,
many cheaper alternatives still exist to obtain long
distance service. The list of ATST competitors in the long
distance market is growing and savings of 25 to 40 percent
are possible using alternative SCC services. The overall
quality of such services, although inferior initially, has
steadily improved to the point that they provide high
quality circuits for long distance service. [Ref. 59]
Overall, terminal equipment prices and long distance
rates have declined while local rates and access fees have
increased. This monetary turbulence further mandates an
active management role if cost-effectiveness is to be
achieved.
D. STRUCTURAL
CCMNAVTELCOM Headquarters has recently undergone a
reorganization. Under this new organizational structure
(detailed in Figure 4.1) NATS management functions will fall
within the Communications Systems Plans (N5) Directorate and
be vested in the Navy Commercial Communications Office (N53)
[Ref. 60]. The Navy Commercial Communications Office will
operate through four field offices to provide NATS manage-
ment support throughout the world. These field offices will
be located in San Diego, Ca. (serving the Western U.S.)
;
Norfolk, VA. (serving the Eastern U.S.) ; Pearl Harbor, Hi.
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At the Headquarters level, the Navy Commercial
Communications Office will employ a total of twenty- two
personnel with approximately 120 to 140 personnel staffing
the field offices. This structure will allow the Navy
Commercial Communications Office organization to support the
overall communications systems planning function of the N5
Directorate and thus support the Commander in discharging
the responsibilities for overall NATS management.
This structural variable is considered an external
influence to the NATS management issue because this head-
quarters structure was formulated to meet the larger manage-
ment requirements of the Naval Telecommunications System,
COMNAVTElCOM's primary tasking.
E. IBFOBMATIOE SECDBITY
Information security has become an ever-increasing
concern within the Government and the DOD in recent years.
It has become a very high visibility issue, due partly to
general media coverage such as broadcasts on the CBS televi-
sion network series "60 Minutes". Even the National
Security Agency (NSA), normally reticent with regard to
publicity, has been in the news because of its concern that
electronic eavesdropping poses a severe threat to the
security of the United States as a result of an increased
usage of communications satellites and microwave transmis-
sion towers for the relay of telephone conversations.
In 1977 President Carter ordered an acceleration of
telephone security programs for the government. The result
of this order was the establishment of the Secure Telephone
Unit (STU) Program. This program has evolved since 1977
into its current phase, the STU III, which is intended to
equip both government and industry (defense contractors)
with over 500,000 secure telephones. These telephones will
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convert speech to digital form, encrypt the speech by the
addition of a pseudorandom noise (PN) digital bit stream and
transmit this encrypted signal over normal telephone lines
using digital modulation.
Contracting for the manufacture of these telephones has
begun and the initial production target for the first two
years is 100,0G0 units. The objectives of the STU III
Program are [Ref- 61]:
1. Volume production deliveries by 1987
2. Size to be that of a conventional office telephone
desk set
3. High quality voice reproduction
4. Ease of installation using standard modular telephone
company interfaces
5. Elimination of special secure storage requirements
6. Full duplex operation over a single telephone circuit
7. Multilevel security from unclassified to top secret
(with positive authentication of the authorized
clearance level)
8. A unit cost of $2,000 or less in production
It is still too early to tell if the program will meet
all of these objectives, but they do serve to indicate the
seriousness with which the information security issue is
being pursued. Just as with the introduction of the new
technologies previously presented, so too the introduction
of an effective, affordable secure telephone will produce a
sharp rise in demand for this capability. This presents an
additional challenge for NATS management from an open system
perspective, since Navy managers will demand this capability




This chapter has outlined the major environmental vari-
ables which are pertinent to an open system approach. In
examining these variables, management complexities imposed
by the regulatory, technological, monetary, structural, and
information security issues become apparent.
The reign of AT&T over the telecommunications industry
eliminated the need for NATS planning functions. Basically,
AT&T dictated the introduction of new technologies, eguip-
ment and services tc the industry. The Navy, like other
consumers, could only choose from among the options delin-
eated by AT&T and thus, the need for planning was absent.
Furthermore, AT&T provided installation and maintenance
services, engineering and design functions and consulting
services in rec ommending the proper mix of AT&T-provided
hardware and services to meet NATS requirements. The regu-
lated monopoly structure of the industry further reduced
planning requirements by providing a stable economic envi-
ronment which eased the burden of programming and budgeting
for NATS. It is clear that the void created by the disap-
pearance of AT&T as a focal point for industry coordination
must be filled.
The forces of a competitive market structure have
resulted in the introduction of new technologies, the
merging of existing technologies, the emergence of dynamic
pricing structures and the proliferation of equipment and
service vendors. The increased awareness and concern over
information security further complicates the scenario.
These changes only serve to emphasize the need for planning,
as well as indicate the necessity of control mechanisms for
the constant reevaluation of shifts within the industry.
Dealing with a competitive industry will force changes
in contracting and procurement efforts as well. To
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adequately and efficiently deal with multiple vendors,
systems analysis and design functions will be required.
NATS node traffic flow and support requirements must be
analyzed in order to develop specifications for system
requirements which form the basis of performance work state-
ments in solicitations to industry. System evaluation
criteria are required in order to develop mechanisms to
evaluate technical responses to these solicitations.
[Ref. 28]
The complexities introduced by these external variables
complicate NATS management requirements. The open system
approach, by incorporating this complexity, will also
require an increasingly complex management strategy to
effectively deal with the interaction.
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V. CLOSED SYSTEM STEATEG
Y
The closed system approach views only those factors
internal to the organization- The chunking of the NATS
management problem and the coordination mechanisms employed
for combining these chunks are then determined by these
internal factors (as presented in Chapter III)
.
A- PBOCEDDEE SPECIFICATIONS
The overall hybrid strategy concept is focused upon
centralized support for decentralized decision making. The
centralized functions are to be focused within the
CCMNAVTE1C0M Headquarters level as depicted in the Interim
Organizational Listing presented in Figure 4.1. The four
field offices of the Navy Commercial Communications Office
are considered part of the Headquarters level for discussion
purposes. It should be noted, however, that this hybrid
strategy does not necessitate a field office concept. All
centralized functions could be performed at the Headquarters
by consolidating personnel if that option proves less
costly. The decentralized decision making is to occur at
the local NATS node unless otherwise indicated.
1 . Node Analysis
Satisfaction of the requisite level of administra-
tive telephone support at the installation is a function of
the identification of local requirements- Since require-
ments vary from installation to installation, node analysis
emerges as the single most important function at the node.
With the primary purpose of NATS as providing a support
function at the local installation, the NATS node manager
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should serve in the administrative staff of the installation
or base commander. In this capacity, the node manager can
serve in an advisory role to the local commander and act as
a central point of contact for local user requests. The
service and hardware acquisition procedures detailed later
will amplify the need for this administrative staff status.
Since user requests are centered on terminal equipment and
installation wiring needs, the node manager can consolidate
requirements for forwarding to the headquarters level.
The second major function of node analysis is the
determination of traffic flow. The collection of data on
traffic flow statistics, such as call origin, destination,
duration, time of day, etc. is vital to engineering and
design, as well as, service and equipment contracting func-
tions. Traffic flow analysis will supply the data base to
support these functicns-
The level of effort required for node analysis will
be a function of installation size. For major installa-
tions, workload requirements will dictate a full-time NATS
manager. Traffic analysis efforts will require the use of
either call logging capabilities inherent to the switchboard
or the addition of separate call monitoring equipment
currently on the market. 16 For minor installations, work-
loads permit collateral-duty NATS managers and traffic anal-
ysis functions to be conducted via user-maintained terminal
equipment logs or from itemized listings provided with
billings.
Traffic flow data coupled with local NATS plant
drawings and plans detailing the specifications and loca-
tions of all terminals and central equipment (switchboards
or PBXs for major installations and terminal blocks for
minor installations) along with cable- plant/installation
16 A discussion of some of the systems available for sale
or lease can be found in Reference 20: pp. 101-103.
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-wiring diagrams form the data base for NATS management.
Most of the plant data required can be obtained from the
mechanized management information system maintained by
NAVFAC's Facilities Support Office at Port Hueneme,
California [Ref- 14: p. D-14].
Once these data bases are established by each NATS
node, the information must be forwarded to the headquarters
level so that it is available as a management tool both
locally and centrally.
2. Engineer in g and Des i gn
Engineering and design functions are beyond the
capabilities of the local installation. For this reason,
these functions should be centrally supported. Due to the
long operational life of major equipment (as evidenced by
the average age of hardware currently in use) and the rela-
tively small number of major NATS installations, the engi-
neering and design functions are conducted by a headquarters
level engineering and design team comprised of members of
the Navy Commercial Communications Office with engineering
support from the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX)
and NAVFAC. A similar process is currently used for the
NTS, whereby a Base Electronic System Engineering Plan
(BESEP) is prepared by NAVEIEX Field Technical Authorities
in concert with NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions [Ref. 1:
encl (1) p. 3, encl (7) pp. 1-2].
During on-site visits the team would coordinate with
the local manager and use the node data base and other
information gathered on-site to determine system and hard-
ware specifications. Returning to headquarters, the team
would use the information obtained from the site visit to
determine specific hardware requirements and to conduct
lease versus buy analysis in accordance with standard proce-
dures (OMB Circulars A-76 and A-94) . This lease vs. buy
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analysis would determine the most economic approach for
major hardware acquisition and would also develop sufficient
data for the formulation of the performance work statement
and technical evaluation plan necessary for competitive
equipment procurement throuqh solicitations for contractor
bids.
3 • Installation and Maintenance
The regional contract approach adopted for the NATS
transition would be retained under this hybrid strategy.
For major installations or installations grouped in a
geographic area, single contracts can be used. For minor
installations, area contracts awarded either by state, Naval
Recruiting Command Areas (8), or Naval Recruiting Command
Districts (52) will be used. [Ref. 28]
The contract strategy employed would depend on
responses to solicitations. As installation and maintenance
is a new market niche, the contract approach must be modi-
fied as necessary to follow market development. The
contract scope of work definition and technical evaluation
package would be developed at the headquarters level, again
using the node data bases and relying upon standardized





The programming and budgeting effort can be totally
decentralized with the exception of management overhead
costs at the headquarters level. For telephone services,
minor equipment, and installation and maintenance costs,
normal installation Planning, Programming and Budgeting
(P?BS) procedures for Operations and Maintenance (O&d) funds
will be followed. Cost data for installation and mainte-
nance will be provided by headquarters and DECCO based upon
the contract costs.
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For major equipment purchases, cost data derived
from the engineering and design procedure will be used for
Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) budget submissions.
The reimbursement of the CSIF from O&M funds will be
accomplished on a monthly basis by the Authorization
Accounting Activity (AAA) servicing the installation or 0&n
Expense Operating Budget (EOB) holder. Although repre-
senting an increased accounting and reporting burden over
present procedures, the advantages overcome this added
burden. If the reimbursement is accomplished centrally the
costs tend to be transparent to the local consumer. This
lack of a user cost incentive contributes to overconsump-
tion. By using local reimbursement procedures, whereby
programmed O&M funds are allocated to the consumer 1 s budget,
the cost incentive is reintroduced and excess consumption
eliminated. This method forces efficient, cost-effective
resource utilization.
5 • Service Acquisit ion
NATS long distance services should be centrally
contracted by DECCO. Standing contracts should be awarded
for both local and SCC services. At the NATS node, the
traditional CSA method will be employed to incur obligations
against these standing contracts.
In selecting the mix of SCC services required, a
least-cost approach, such as that formulated by Scctt
Klingler [Bef. 62], should be used. Similar methods are
also currently available from the private sector as well
[Ref. 63]. For installations with access to adequate
computer facilities, the analysis can be conducted on-site.
If no computer facilities are available locally, support
should be provided by the headquarters level.
This least-cost approach uses current rate tables of
the long distance carriers to determine the lowest cost
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alternative, based upcn node traffic flow data for a three-
ioontlt period. This computer analysis coupled with estima-
tion techniques such as those described by Klingler
[Ref. 62: pp. 63-65], will provide the NATS node manager
with the information required to choose the least-cost
alternative for SCC service. The full implementation of
equal access will further simplify the analysis process by
eliminating the need for dedicated leased access trunks
[Ref. 64: p. 22].
To support this procedure, the headquarters level
must maintain current rate tables for SCC offerings and
provide computer support for the analysis. For installa-
tions with access to local computer facilities, rate table
data should be provided by the headquarters level while
installations without such computer access must forward
current traffic flow data (in machine readable format) to
the headquarters for analysis. Annual review requirements
for the analysis will ensure that local SCC service choices
remain least-cost choices. Such methods are considered to
be within the capabilities of local NATS management
personnel if adequate central support is available. As
example, more complex economic analysis techniques than
these are currently supplied for use in ADP applications
[Ref. 65].
6. Equipment Acquisiti on
Contracts for the lease or purchase of major equip-
ment will be centralized under DSCCO. These contracts will
be competitively awarded based upon specifications and eval-
uation criteria established by the headquarters level during
the engineering and design procedure. Again, these
contracts should be financed by CSIF funds for lease agree-
ments with reimbursement by the NATS node using O&M funds.
For major equipment purchases, activities will submit a
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Military Interservice Procurement Request (MIPR) to DECCO.
DECCO should then competitively award the contract citing
the activity's 05K or OPN funds, as appropriate.
B. SINOPSIS
The development of the hybrid strategy was based upon
certain assumptions regarding policy requirements and plan-
ning objectives which are considered generic and not
strategy-specific. The procedures developed to accomplish
the objectives for the hybrid strategy center upon the
concept of centralized support for decentralized decision
making. The key tocl used in these procedures is the NATS
node data base which is developed during node analysis.
This data base is an input to other procedures and thus the
node manager must ensure that the data base is current and
accurate.
Cost-effectiveness is achieved with the hybrid approach
by requiring economic analysis for lease vs. buy decisions
for both major equipment, service and terminal equipment
acquisition. Competitively awarding contracts furthers this
objective and the use of the CSIF and I1IPR procedures with
local CSM/OPN reimbursement focuses NATS costs at the local
user level. The local programming and budgeting of funds
for NATS requirements overcomes the hidden communications
cost problem associated with CSIF funding. By forcing NATS
users to consider the cost of administrative telephone
services, the requirements for such services will be exam-
ined more thoroughly and the uncontrolled growth of require-
ments will be checked.
The programming and budgeting approach requires no major
modifications to the Navy Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System. The OSM allocation procedures must be
modified to permit funds to flow to the EOB holder instead
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of being allocated to a central authority, as is currently
the case with funds for leased NTS requirements being allo-
cated to COMNAVTELCCK [Eef. 1: end (3) ]„ The accounting
systems already in place at the AAAs are considered adequate
to accommodate the reimbursement of the CSIF by OSH funds
from EOB holders- Programming and budgeting for major
equipment purchases via OPN funds represent little change
from current procedures.
The hybrid approach is not personnel intensive. The
NATS managers currently in place at the nodes can handle the
increased duties of the hybrid strategy if adequate head-
quarters level support is provided. The 140-160 personnel
envisioned for the Navy Commercial Communications Office
organization are considered sufficient to handle centralized
functions if engineering support is obtained from NAVFAC and
NAVE1EX.
Finally, the reliance upon DECCO for centralized
contracting functions minimizes personnel requirements at
the headquarters level. The additional benefits to be
derived from this centralized purchasing concept include:
(1) the minimization of duplication of effort and differing
purchasing practices; (2) increased efficiency due to quan-
tity discounts, purchasing specialization and reduced record
keeping requirements; and (3) economies of scale in that
maximum competitive advantage results from the greater
economic purchasing power achieved by centralization.
[Eef. 13: pp. 54-55]
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71. OPEN SYSTEM APPROACH
A. POLICY ISSUES
As the Chief of Naval Operations stated in the 1980
OPNAY Instruction which governs Naval Telecommunications
System operating requirements [Ref. 1: p. 2]:
"The increasing high costs of telecommunications
support, especially leased services, have resulted in high
visibility of communications programs at all levels of
government. This fact underscores the need for management
awareness and improved life cycle documentation of telecom-
munications resources.
Development and planning for a responsive Naval
Telecommunications System requires early identification and
consideration of user requirements so that requisite
programming to obtain necessary resources can be accom-
plished. The recognition, definition and submission of
telecommunications requirements ... will permit system plan-
ning and programming to acquire necessary resources."
Although the statement was focused upon the Naval
Telecommunications System, the concepts expressed are
directly applicable to the Naval Administrative Telephone
System as well. Divestiture and the resultant competitive
turbulence have spurred a heightened visibility of communi-
cations programs since this 1980 instruction was issued.
Efforts to deal with unrest in the telecommunications
arena are ongoing. The January 29, 1985 reorganization
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense serves as an
example of this continuing effort. The reorganization
resulted in, among other things, the consolidation of all
DOD command, control, communications and intelligence (C 3 I)
functions under an Assistant Secretary of Defense for C 3I.
As Secretary Weinberger stated, the consolidation of C 3 I
functions was "... to insure consistency of DOD policy
development, resource management and program evaluation
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...." In a DOD Memorandum to the services, Weinberger
explained the concept further, "... it is important that
there should be a central management mechanism for the
review of DOD wide C 3I issues to establish priorities, make
the trade offs that are essential for cost effective program
balance and make effective decisions and recommendations
" [Eef. 66]
This DOD staff reorganization is a structural approach
to cope with the increased complexities of telecommunica-
tions management and the increasing visibility of DOD
resource allocation and utilisation. Increased complexity
and visibility considerations raise certain issues to the
forefront. The merger of computer and telephone technolo-
gies with the implicit assumption of economies of scope to
be realized by the utilization of shared resources (i.e.,
PBXs and telephone wiring) coupled with the need for NATS
plant modernization indicates a requirement for Navy tele-
communications policy review. It is estimated that 85
percent of all teleprocessing 17 requirements are local, i.e.
within twenty-five miles [Eef. 67: p. 81]. The issue of
long distance teleprocessing has been resolved by mandating
Navy-wide use of the DDN [Eef. 68 ] # however, the local issue
still exists. As Navy managers continue to require
increased teleprocessing support, the number of telepro-
cessing systems is expected to increase rapidly [Eef- 67: p.
78]. This rapid expansion of teleprocessing requirements,
together with the merger of technologies and the NATS
modernization requirement mandate the need for a base-line
review of Naval telecommunications policy.
At the present time administrative telephone systems are
excluded from those policies governing automatic data
processing (ADP) and other communications requirements.
1 teleprocessing is a form of information handling in
which data processing systems use communications facilities.
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This chunking of AD? responsibilities to COMNAVDAC and NTS
and NATS responsibilities to COMNAVTELCOM precludes
COMNAVTEICOM from affecting the coordination necessary to
achieve the cost benefits of shared resources to be achieved
through modern technology. Furthermore, the tendency has
been to view ADP from a 196 0s computer technology focus,
when processing capability was centered in large, expensive
mainframe computer systems and economies of scale dictated
ADP resource centralization. In today's computer technology
of distributed data bases, LANs and mini- and microcom-
puters, as much (or more) processing capability can be
achieved at far less cost using PBX-based LANs.
These issues are not unique to the Department of the
Navy; similar factors are confronting all the services.
From an open system perspective, both internal and environ-
mental variables must be considered in resolving these
issues. The U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force have already
proceeded with actions aimed at resolving the problem.
The Army's action commenced in 1984 with the announce-
ment of the establishment of a staff agency and a major
command to coordinate the modernization of information
management, communications, and command and control systems.
The establishment of the Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Information Management (OACSIM) was completed in late
July. This staff agency is to formulate the policy to
enable the integration of all information resource manage-
ment, automation, administration, communications, and
command and control. The major command (which will be fully
operational by the end of FY 85) is the U.S. Army
Information System Command (OSAISC) . The "JSAISC is being
formed by merging the Army Communications Command and the
Army Computer Systems Command. This action being taken by
the Army is in response to the need to ensure that money is
being spent on automation, communications, information
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management and command and control systems that are mutually
compatible. [Eef. 69]
The Air Force has adopted a similar approach. In 1983
the position of Assistant Chief of Staff, Information
Systems (AF/SI) was created at the Headquarters, U.S. Air
Force. AF/SI commenced developing organizational models
merging communications and data automation functions at all
levels throughout the Air Force. The Air Force
Communications Command was identified as the logical choice
to manage these merged functions. Onder the model, the AFCC
would implement, operate and maintain each major Air Force
Command's information system under the direct operational
control cf the host commands. In late 1984 the first of
these planned mergers occurred when the Strategic Air
Command (SAC) data and office automation functions and
resources were combined with the telecommunications
resources of the AFCC [Eefs. 70,71]. This U.S. Air Force
effort represents another example of the requirement to face
the complex issues of information transfer with pronounced
organizational thrusts.
As stated in Reference 1, "The basic telecommunications
requirement is the need to transfer information, which in
turn is translated into specific circuit requirements.
"
This need to transfer information, whether it be by voice,
record message traffic, computers, electronic mail, etc.,
should be governed by a single policy; otherwise, fragmenta-
tion results and conflicting requirements for thresholds,
submission procedures, etc. {such as those identified in
Reference 72) can occur. Without a dynamic coordinating
mechanism, the overall effort can only be inefficient.
The lack of a single policy within the Department of the
Navy for information systems reinforces a close! system view
by continuing former work breakdown patterns. This has
produced fragmentation and duplication of effort and the
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hierarchical overlay used for this breakdown precludes
effective coordination at the second and third echelon
command level. For example, both ADP and NATS support
levels are established as a function of local requirements.
Although these requirements coexist at the local level,
requests to fulfill them are currently submitted through
separate administrative chains to third and second echelon
commands. These requests are then forwarded through sepa-
rate divisions in the OPNAV staff, to eventually merge again
at the OP-094 level. Such an organizational overlay
precludes addressing issues such as economies of scope to be
realized through shared resources since, under current
policy, the necessary formal authority does not exist at
intermediate levels.
The need for an open system approach is evident. The
Army and Air Force have met this challenge with sweeping
reorganizations. However, the existence of a professional
corps of communications personnel within these services has
certainly influenced these organizational reactions. The
need for such an organizational approach within the Navy is
not immediately obvious. However, it is obvious that an
open system approach is needed.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The transfer of management responsibility for the Navy's
administrative telephones to the Commander, Naval
Telecommunications Command can be viewed as an organiza-
tional attempt at meeting the complex challenges presented
by fundamental structural changes within the telecommunica-
tions industry. The dichotomy of the closed system and open
system approaches to organizational development and manage-
ment theory is a useful tool in analyzing these complex
challenges. Although the demarcation lines between these
two approaches become nebulous at times, they prove useful
in modeling the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture manage-
ment requirements for the Navy's administrative telephones.
Prior to the breakup of the Bell System and increasing
competitive forces within the telecommunications industry,
the closed system approach proved adequate for managing the
NATS. With the external environment stable, management
efforts could be focused upon internal factors. AT&T, as
the industry monopolist, was functioning, in effect, in a
pseudo-management capacity for the NATS. With the breakup
of the Eell System, AT&T could no longer function in this
capacity. The advent of strong competitive forces within
the industry quickly spurred technological innovation and an
acceleration of market turbulence. The proliferation of
equipment and service vendors complicated purchasing strat-
egies. The merger of computer and telephone technologies
coupled with the rapid increase in demand for voice and
electronic mail services, video teleconferencing and other
competition-spawned services further complicates the NATS
management task.. The conclusion is that an open system
approach is required for NATS management. This need to
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interact with the environmental factors is exemplified by
the management strategies adopted by the Army and Air Force
in integrating all information transfer functions under one
central management structure. Kith this approach, cost-
effectiveness is achieved by maximizing the benefits of the
economies of scope to be realized through shared resources.
It is evident that any fundamental change in overall
management policy will require time to analyze and imple-
ment. Therefore, CCMNAVTELCOM must assume a closed system
approach for NATS management until such time as fundamental
policy shifts may be accomplished.
A closed system management strategy must, at a minimum,
fulfill traditional management responsibilities while at the
same time fill the void created by the removal of AT&T as
the industry monopolist. Toward this end, a closed system
management strategy was posed in Chapter V, and procedures
were presented to meet these traditional and new management
responsibilities from a cost-effective standpoint. The
final selection among all the strategic alternatives must be
made, however, from an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of
each alternative.
This closed system approach is viewed as, at best, a
short term solution. The volatility of the telecommunica-
tions environment dictates an open system approach based
upon a solid analysis of overall telecommunications require-
ments, both present and future, within the Department of the
Navy. For this approach to be effective, two conditions are
necessary. These two conditions were summarized by Peter
Drucker, noted author and management theorist, as: "...
knowledge by the entire organization of what the direction,
the goals, the expectations are; and knowledge by top
management as to what the decisions, commitments and efforts
of the people in the organization are. The needed focus -
one might call it a 'model of the relevants in internal and
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external environment' - only a 'long-range plan' can
provide" [Ref. 73: p. 136]. But, for a long range plan to
succeed, a coherent organizational overlay must exist to
implement and monitor the plan. For long range planning is,
as Drucker defined it, " the continuous process of making
present 'entrepreneurial (risk-taking) decisions' systemati-
cally and with the best possible knowledge of their
futurity, organizing systematically the efforts needed to
carry out these decisions, and measuring the results of
these decisions against the expectations through 'organized,
systematic feedback'" [Eef. 73: pp. 132-133].
To accomplish this task, three steps emerge as impor-
tant. First, the development of a short term management
strategy is recommended for NATS. A least-cost approach is
indicated in the formulation of this strategy.
The second recommendation is that a base-line review of
the Navy's information transfer requirements be conducted.
This review should assess these requirements in light of
current and projected technological advances.
The third and final recommendation is that this base-
line requirements review be used as the foundation for an
analysis of the organizational structure required to meet
the management challenges of information transfer within the
Navy. The decision to retain current hierarchical struc-
tures or to formulate new functionally-oriented organiza-
tional units must be made upon this objective analysis if
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